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MANDATE AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE LowER COURT - COMPLIANCE
WITH MANDATE OR DIRECTIONS - Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 932 (1967).- In a prior decision involving
the same matter, the United States Supreme Court held that acquisition of a
pipeline corporation by one of the appellees violated the antitrust laws.
Consequently, the Court directed the district court "to order divestiture
without delay." Subsequent to this decision the Department of Justice set-
tied with the party. However, this settlement did not fully satisfy the Su-
preme Court's mandate that a new company be created to compete with
the appellee. The district court seemingly approved this agreement and
denied appellants intervention in the case.
With two Justices dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
by granting intervention and abrogating the settlement agreement. Further-
more, it set up guidelines for the district court to follow in fashioning its
decree. In so doing, the Court commented that it did not question the au-
thority of the Justice Department to settle suits both before and after they
reached the high Court. However, it did question the Attorney General's
authority to circumscribe the power of the lower courts to carry out the
Court's mandates. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that only it, and not
the Department of Justice, had the authority to alter or modify its decrees,
thus following the general rule that a lower court on remand must comply
with the mandate of the appellate court and obey its directions without vari-
ations.
AUTOMOBILES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - SAFETY DEVICES - Schemel v. General Motors
Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966). - Plaintiff was seriously in-
jured when the car in which he was riding was rear-ended by an automobile
travelling at 115 mph. Suit was brought against defendant for manufac-
turing vehicles, without governors, that are capable of attaining excessive
speeds and for advertising these automobiles to people who could be ir-
responsible. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
In holding that defendant was not liable, the court stated that where
the peril is obvious to everyone, a manufacturer's only duty is to make his
product reasonably fit for its intended use; it is to be anticipated that ir-
responsible people will drive at unreasonable speeds. As for equipping
cars with governors, the court found that there is no provision for this de-
vice in the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act. Further, finding the
manufacturer not liable for making cars capable of attaining high speeds,
the court held that the defendant could not be liable for advertising its
product.
BANKRUPTCY
CLAIMS AGAINST AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE - PROVABLE CLAIMS -
In the Matter of L J. Knight Realty Corp., 370 F.2d 624 (3d Cit. 1967). -
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On November 16, 1962, the I. J. Knight Corporation filed a petition for
arrangement, and a receiver was appointed under Chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. On April 3, 1963, appellant filed a claim alleging that the
receiver was negligent in permitting a fire to start and spread, causing per-
sonal and property damage to appellant. The claim stated it was "for ad-
ministrative expenses due to the negligence of the Receiver in operation of
the business of the debtor." In May of 1963 the debtor was voluntarily
declared a bankrupt.
The court, in affirming the referee's decision, held that appellant's claim
was not entitled to the priority accorded costs of administration by section
64 sub. a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court stated that in order to
give a meaningful construction to congressional intent, they would follow
the rule that expenses unrelated to the development and preservation of the
bankrupt's assets are not within the phrase "cost of administration." The
dissent felt that the intent of Congress was not so dear as to require that
section 64 sub. a(1) immunize from tort liability a business operated by a
receiver under a Chapter XI proceeding.
BANKS AND BANKING
BANKING Acr - SECUmiTIES AND INVESTMENTS - Baker Watts & Co. v.
Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1967). - Section 21 of the Banking Act
of 1933 is designed to prohibit commercial banks from investing in anything
but public securities. Until 1963 the Federal Reserve System and the
Comptroller of the Currency construed the statute as permitting investment
only in securities of political subdivisions which have the power of taxa-
tion. In 1963 the Comptroller formulated a regulation permitting national
banks to invest in public securities regardless of whether they were sup-
ported by the taxing power. This action was brought by plaintiff-invest-
ment bankers for a declaratory judgment adjudicating the regulation in-
valid and an injunction prohibiting the allowed practice as being illegal
competition.
In granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the court held
that the regulation was invalid. The words "general obligations" used in
the statute had always been understood to mean obligations supported by
the taxing power. The court felt that since it was the congressional intent
to allow only a very narrow exception to the prohibition, the exception pro-
vision must be narrowly construed.
JOINT DEPOSITS - RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP - Estate of Stamets, 148
N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1967). - In an action for a declaratory judgment, the
administratrix of an estate sought to have the money in a bank account de-
clared an asset of the estate as against defendant, the joint payee of the ac-
count, who claimed by right of survivorship. The decedent had opened the
account in his name and defendant's, but defendant had never signed the
bank's signature card. Decedent had specified in the deposit agreement
that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was intended.
In affirming the district court's judgment for the joint payee, the state
supreme court found that the contract between decedent and the bank was
sufficient to create a joint tenancy with the joint payee as donee-beneficiary
of the contract. Under Iowa Code section 528.64, which regulates the crea-
tion of a joint tenancy in a bank account, the signatures of both payees are
not required. Going further, the court said that the defendant's right to
the money in the account could be upheld by finding that a valid contract
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was entered into with the bank to create a joint tenancy and that the de-
fendant's signature as donee-beneficiary was not required. Here the evi-
dence dearly rebutted the presumption that a tenancy in common was in-
tended.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
DIVERSITY - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr - Black v. United States, 263
F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah 1967). - Plaintiff sought damages under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act for injuries allegedly due to the negligence of defend- "
ant's employee. In an amended petition, plaintiff's husband sued for loss of
consortium as a result of the injury. Defendant moved to strike the hus-
band's claim for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could
be granted.
The court granted the motion, stating that under the law of the forum
state, Utah, loss of consortium was not compensable in negligence actions.
Although the high court of Utah had not passed on the matter, the district
court felt that the language of the relevant state statutes indicated that a
spouse could not recover for loss of consortium under the circumstances.
Admitting that Utah's view was contrary to the weight of authority and to
the common law, the court averred that the rule announced in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) required it to discern the law of the
forum jurisdiction although that law might appear unreasonable.
JURISDICTION - LIMITATION OF ACrIONS - Newman v. Freeman, 262
F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966). - In an action for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to include his
father's claim for medical expenses and loss of services. Objection was made
on the grounds that diversity existed only as between defendant and plain-
tiff and that more than two years had passed after the accident so as to bar
the father's claim via the statute of limitations. The district court overruled
the objection and granted leave to amend.
In reaching its decision the court ruled that although joinder of the
father would destroy diversity between plaintiff and defendant, the addi-
tional claim for relief came within the court's pendent jurisdiction. It is
significant that the court refused to limit the application of pendent juris-
diction to cases involving a federal question, thus somewhat mollifying the
requirement of complete diversity where diversity of citizenship is the basis
of federal jurisdiction. Also, the court, in applying Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the procedural issue regarding the statute of
limitations, concluded that since the father had filed a timely claim in a
state court, justice required that the amendment relate back to the original
pleading.
TRIAL - ADVISORY JuRY - Poston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Hawaii 1967). - In an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act against
the United States and in a diversity suit against several other defendants,
the court granted plaintiff's request for a jury trial against the other de-
fendants and on its own motion stated that it would permit the jury to act
in advisory capacity as to the defendant United States. The United States
objected on the ground that the act only authorized a trial without a jury.
In overruling the objection the court pointed out that Rule 39(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court on its own motion to
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allow an advisory jury in all actions not providing for a jury trial as a mat-
ter of right.
The two federal courts which have previously decided the same question
are split. The court which took the opposite view in Honeycutt v. United
States, 19 F.LD. 229 (W.D. La. 1956) did so on the basis that the act for-
bids the use of a jury of any type, whereas the court in Schetter v. Housing
Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955) and the instant court believe
that Rule 39(c) dearly permits the use of an advisory jury and that the
act prohibits only the ordinary jury.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADmCmTRnATvE LAW - CoUNTy DIsMXssAL - Rosenfield v. Malcolm,
55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967). - Petitioner held a provisional position as as-
sistant county health officer. When he refused to resign from a lawful,
voluntary organization called the "Ad Hoc Committee To End Discrimina-
tion;' he was dismissed. Upon his writ of mandate to compel reinstate-
ment, the trial court upheld defendant county's contention that a county
employee who has not yet attained protected civil service status is subject
to dismissal without notice or hearing. The California Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that even though an employee has not yet attained protected
status he may not be summarily dismissed for political activities displeasing
to his superior.
The court reasoned that an employee's political rights are not set by the
rules of the county's civil service commission but by the United States Con-
stitution. Unquestionably, governmental agencies retain broad discretion as
to which provisional employees they will retain; however, public employ-
ment may not be conditioned upon a waiver of constitutional rights.
COURSE AND CONDUCr OF TRIAL - PRiOR CoNvIcnioNs - Spenser v.
Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967). - Petitioners challenged the constitution-
ality of Texas' procedure in the administration of its recidivist statute. Es-
sentially the procedure permitted introduction of proof of a defendant's past
convictions, thereby fully informing the jury of previous derelictions. The
jury was then charged that such matters were not to be taken into account
in determining guilt or innocence but were to be used only in fixing the
punishment if the defendant was found guilty under the current indictment.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court held that this procedure
was not so fundamentally unfair as to render it violative of the fourteenth
amendment.
The dissent was of the opinion that the use of prior convictions did not
meet the requirements of due process because it prejudiced the accused with-
out advancing any legitimate state interest. The dissent favored first hav-
ing a trial to determine guilt or innocence and then, if guilt was determined,
having a second hearing at which evidence of prior convictions would be
admitted in order to determine the penalty.
HABEAS CORPUS - PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF - Shear v. Boles, 263 F.
Supp. 855 (N.D.W. Va. 1967). - Petitioner had been indicated for two
attempted armed robberies to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to ten years. His habeas corpus petition was successful since his pleas had
been involuntary, but he was retried by a jury and given consecutive fif-
teen-year sentences. Petitioner again sought habeas corpus, claiming that
the increased sentence was unconstitutional.
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In rejecting petitioner's claim, the court distinguished Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), where the petitioner had been acquitted be-
fore retrial and proceeded to establish standards to determine whether a
habeas corpus court should interfere with the sentencing court's punishment.
The district court found that the judge had not assumed the role of an in-
quisitor, and, in applying its standards, decided that with no indicia of per-
sonal hostility by the second judge, petitioner was not entitled to habeas
corpus. In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished a recent case,
Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D. N.C. 1966), by finding
that the second judge in that case had exhibited personal hostility toward
the petitioner.
HABEAS CORPUS - SUSPENSION OF R MEDY - Smnartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d
788 (6th Cir. 1967). - The Tennessee Pardon, Parole and Probation Board
had adopted a rule that any inmate who unsuccessfully sought release by
habeas corpus should not be granted a parole hearing until at least one year
after his regular parole date. Appellee had failed in an attempt to win
release by habeas corpus and brought the present habeas corpus proceeding
to restrain the board from enforcing its rule against him and all those
similarly situated. The district court found the rule unconstitutional and
granted an injunction.
In affirming that decision, the court of appeals found that appellee had
the required standing under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and ruled
that the Board's regulation was unconstitutional because it acted as a de-
terrent to the right of prisoners to seek habeas corpus.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - SUSPICIOUS PERSONS ORDINANCES - City
of Cleveland v. Forrest, 223 N.E.2d 661 (Cleveland Munic. Ct. 1967).-
Defendant was charged with violating a City of Cleveland suspicious per-
sons ordinance which made it a misdemeanor for any person to be found
"wandering about the streets, either by day or by night, without being able
to give a reasonable and satisfactory account of themselves." Defendant
had been observed standing at a bus stop with several other persons for a
period of less than five minutes.
The Cleveland Municipal Court granted defendant's motion for dis-
charge, holding that the ordinance violated the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. The court held that in per-
mitting "compulsory interrogation" of persons by placing the burden on
them to justify their presence on the public streets, the ordinance violated
the procedures defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and
the right to remain silent guaranteed by the fifth amendment as applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The court further found
the ordinance unconstitutional for it permitted the police to seize a citizen
without probable cause in violation of the rights secured by the fourth
amendment.
PERSONAL, CIVIL, AN POLITICAL RIGHTS - FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966). - Plaintiff, in her ap-
plication for Medicare benefits, refused to answer whether or not she was a
member of any organization required to register under the Internal Security
Act of 1950. Her application was delayed for six months, and, when it was fi-
nally approved, she was singled out for warnings not given to other applicants
who had answered such questions. Section 103(b) (1) of the Medicare
Act operates to deny benefits to certain applicants who are members of or-
1418
CASES NOTED
ganizations required to register under the 1950 act. After resolving the
issue of plaintiff's standing to sue in her favor, the court upheld plaintiff's
contention that section 103(b) (1) violated her first amendment rights of
freedom of speech, assembly, and association.
The court, in reaching its conclusion, relied upon United States Supreme
Court cases which establish the rule that a statute which sweeps too broadly
and which punishes for knowing but guiltless behavior is invalid.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF THE PRISONER
State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 250 (Ore. 1966). - Incident to a lawful arrest for
intoxication and a subsequent lawful search, a police officer seized a bottle
containing pills and which had been found in defendant's possession. Al-
though the officer was unaware of the pills' composition, a laboratory analy-
sis proved them to be a narcotic, and on this evidence defendant was in-
dicted for the possession of narcotics. In a five-to-two decision, the Oregon
Supreme Court upheld a motion to suppress, holding that the arresting offi-
cer had no grounds for a reasonable belief that the pills were contraband,
and since they thus could not be seized, they were not admissible into evi-
dence pursuant to requirements of the fourth amendment and the Oregon
Constitution.
While the court's interpretation is in accord with the views of many
who claim that even under stop-and-frisk laws a police officer must have a
reasonable belief that seized material is contraband, there are those who
claim that an arresting officer may temporarily seize any property incident
to a lawful search, for the purpose of determining if it is stolen or contra-
band. Thus, until the Supreme Court renders a decision, the issue of the
seizability and subsequent admissibility into evidence of articles, the legal
right to the possession of which is unknown, is open to speculation.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE - BUSING OF PRIVATE SCHOOL
CHILDREN - Rhoades v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 226 A.2d 53
(Pa. 1967). - A Pennsylvania statute required the provision of free trans-
portation for students attending private, nonprofit elementary and high
schools if similar transportation was provided for public school children.
In upholding the statute's constitutionality, Everson v. Board of Education,
330 US. 1 (1947) was cited for the proposition that the act did not violate
federal first amendment prohibitions against state establishment of a reli-
gion. Similarly, state constitutional provisions were not violated since:
(1) the buses were only to traverse "established public school bus routes";
thus no preference was given to any religion; (2) no direct financial bene-
fits were received by non-public schools; and (3) the protection of all
school children through a proper transportation system served the same pub-
lic function as does the state's provision of lunches and health care for all
students.
However, in light of the divided opinions in other jurisdictions over the
constitutionality of similar acts, there is clear justification for the dissents
position that the Everson doctrine has been so undermined by recent Su-
preme Court decisions that it is no longer viable.
CONTRACTS
SUBCONTRACTING - MASTER AND SERVANT - New York, C. & St. Louis
R.R. v. Heffner Constr. Co., 9 Ohio App.2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 648 (1967).
- Plaintiff brought an action for damages when its freight train was de-
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railed in a collision with a truck driven by an employee of defendant's sub-
contractor. Plaintiff contended that a hauling contract between the sub-
contractor and defendant, and a contract for construction of a highway be-
tween the state of Ohio and defendant, raised a jury question as to an ex-
isting agency relationship.
The court, after carefully examining the terms of the various contracts,
followed the general rule that where contract terms are clear and unam-
biguous, the contract's interpretation is for the court and not the jury. The
court said that the contract with the state providing that subletting a por-
tion of the contract "shall relieve the contractor of no responsibility" did not
as a matter of law create liability in defendant for the negligence of the sub-
contractor when such negligence was not related to the method or manner
of highway construction, nor did certain rights reserved in the contract be-
tween the subcontractor and defendant change that relationship from one
of employer and independent contractor to a relationship of master and
servant.
CRIMINAL LAw
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY DEPosInoNs - State ex
rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159 (1967). - De-
fendants, indicted for first degree murder, applied for a commission to take
discovery depositions of certain witnesses. The Supreme Court of Ohio,
reversing an appellate court's writ of prohibition, held that a trial judge
has the power to commission pre-trial discovery depositions in a criminal
case when such procedure is not prohibited by the state or federal constitu-
tion and that such discretion, tempered by judicial and statutory guidelines,
does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative powers.
The Ohio court's decision is supported by the general view that a state's
constitution is primarily a limitation rather than a grant of authority on
the state legislative power. Unless limited at the state or federal level, the
state legislature has plenary power to provide for the controlled, discretion-
ary judicial taking of discovery depositions in criminal cases.
HOMICIDE - FELONY-MURDER - People v. Butler, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 511 (1967). - Defendant was convicted of first degree felony-mur-
der. He had gone to the deceased's home to collect a debt owed to him by
the deceased. During a discussion between the two, the deceased produced
a gun. Defendant also produced a gun, a struggle ensued and a gun went
off, killing the deceased. Defendant thereafter searched for money to pay
the debt owed to him and, finding none, took a wallet and fled. Being
charged with first degree felony-murder, the defendant argued that intent
was a necessary element of robbery, but this was overruled by the court.
In a decision of first impression, the California Supreme Court held that
where a finding that the defendant had killed the deceased in perpetration
of a robbery was necessary to convict the defendant of first degree felony-
murder, the defendant is entitled to the defense that he honestly believed the
deceased owed him the money and that denial of the defense is reversible
error.
PROBABLE CAUSE - INFORMANTS - McCray v. Illinois, 87 Sup. Ct. 1056
(1967). - Petitioner was arrested for the possession of heroin. The ar-
resting officers had acted without an arrest warrant and solely on informa-
tion given them by an undisclosed informer. Petitioner's motion to sup-
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press was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis of an Illinois
evidentiary rule which grants governmental privilege to the identity of in-
formers when the issue is merely probable cause for arrest and not guilt or
innocence.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court upheld the state court
and distinguished Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1956) on the
basis that in Roviaro the informer played a material part in bringing about
the illegal possession of narcotics and was essential to the merits of the case
and not merely for determining probable cause. Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Forras, and the Chief Justice dissented on the basis that the fourth amend-
ment requires police to obtain a warrant unless they have personal knowl-
edge which gives them probable cause.
Tm OF TRIAL AN CONTINUANCE - RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL -
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 Sup. Ct. 988 (1967). - Petitioner was in-
dicted for unlawful trespass, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict,
whereupon a mistrial was declared and the case continued for the term. The
state then made a motion for a nolle prosequi with leave, a North Carolina
procedure which allows the case to be restored to the trial docket at a later
date. Petitioner applied for an immediate trial and was refused. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to interfere with the discre-
tion vested in the prosecutor and the trial judge.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, deploring the ex-
tended anxiety, uncertainty, and public scorn which the petitioner must suf-
fer when unable to clear himself of criminal charges. The Court held that
it was just such situations that the sixth amendment was designed to pre-
vent and that the sixth amendment was made obligatory on the states by
the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result,
felt that the North Carolina provision was fundamentally unfair and a vio-
lation of due process under the fourteenth amendment.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
HEIRS AND NEXT OF KIN - INFANT EN VENTRE SA MERE - Estate of
Wolyniec v. Moe, 226 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). - Defendant's
mother murdered the intestate grandfather of defendant two months prior
to his birth. The administratrix contested defendant's right to share in the
estate of the grandfather. In a case of first impression, the court held that
defendant should share in the grandfather's estate as next of kin.
It was first held that the mother was properly barred from sharing in the
estate because she had murdered the grandfather. The court then applied
the New Jersey doctrine by which, for the purpose of taking property, a
child en ventre sa mere is considered to have been born at the time of the
intestate's death and held that the child replaced the mother as next of kin.
The court indicated that a contrary result would have been unconscionable,
because it would have penalized the innocent defendant for the crime of his
mother.
DIVORCE
JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF - JUDGMENT OR DECREE -
Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). - In an ap-
peal by the wife from a divorce decree, defendant husband cross-assigned
error to that portion of the decree which ordered him to "cooperate with
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plaintiff in obtaining a Jewish divorce." Without reaching the constitu-
tional questions involved, the District Court of Appeals held that since
Florida law provides only for a civil divorce, the chancellor had no power to
require a party to cooperate in securing a religious divorce.
This is the second reported case to bear upon the religious divorce ques-
tion. The other case, Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 3 App. Div. 2d 953 (1957), held that an
agreement in which the husband promised the wife to take part in a Jewish
religious divorce was in fact enforceable where a separate action was
brought by the wife for specific performance.
EMINENT DoMAIN
PROCEEDINGS To TAKE PRoPERTY - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT - Iowa
State Highway Comm'n v. Hipp, 147 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1966). - Em-
ployees of plaintiff highway commission attempted, without statutory author-
ization, to enter upon lands owned by defendant for the purpose of conduct-
ing surveys prior to the commencement of eminent domain proceedings.
When defendant resisted the intrusion, plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment to establish its right to enter. The trial court held that plaintiff's pro-
posed entrance would be unlawful and would constitute a trespass.
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the
trial court's decision, holding that plaintiff commission did not have a right
incident to its power of eminent domain to conduct preliminary surveys.
The court strictly construed the right of eminent domain against plaintiff,
ruling that the power to institute preliminary surveys must be based upon
clear statutory authorization and could not be implied by judicial decision.
In so holding, the court contravened Thomas v. City of Horse Cave, 249 Ky.
713, 61 S.W.2d 601 (1933), the only decision squarely on point with the
instant case.
INSURANCE
CONSTRUCTION OF EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE - AUTOMOBILES - Great
Central Ins. Co. v. Marble, 369 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1966). - In a diversity
suit plaintiff insurance company sought to avoid liability to the insured de-
fendant for damages arising when an automobile struck a modified stock
car which defendant was towing to a stock car race. Under the policy's ex-
clusion clause, the insurance company was not liable for damages arising
from the "maintenance, operation or use of any structurally altered or spe-
cially designed automobile" while involved in or "going to" any race or
speed contest.
In affirming the district court's decision for the insured, the appellate
court re-affirmed the general principle or insurance law that a policy's words
of exclusion are to be narrowly interpreted. Here the act of towing was
not included in the words of the clause. Further, the reason for excluding
modified racers from coverage - the increased risk - was not present
where the car was in a dead tow. Nor was the car, while in tow, being
"operated" within the meaning of the clause.
LIFE INSURANCE - ACCIDENTAL MEANS - Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967). - The decedent, whose life was insured under a
policy issued by defendant, died as a result of a self-administered overdose
of narcotics. Plaintiff, the named beneficiary under the policy, sought to
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recover on a "double indemnity" provision which became operative if the
decedent succumbed "through accidental means." From a reversal of a
favorable verdict at trial, plaintiff appealed to the state supreme court which
reinstated the judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the decedent's death
fell within the coverage of the policy.
The court overruled its prior holdings and joined the trend of decisions
throughout the United States by rejecting a distinction between deaths that
are accidental results and deaths that result from accidental means. Prior
to the instant case, Pennsylvania had followed the rule of Landress v. Phoe-
nix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934), which limited recovery under
"accidental means" insurance clauses to instances where the proximate cause
of death was the result of an unexpected event. The court in the instant
case relied upon the strong dissent in Landress by Mr. Justice Cardozo, who
claimed that the common understanding of accident provisions did not dis-
tinguish between accidental means and accidental results.
LABOR RELATIONS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACncES - CoERcION - NLRB v. Hobart Bros. Co.,
372 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1967). - During an organizational campaign de-
fendant employer sent letters to its employees stating that authorization
cards were not always kept in the "strictest" confidence as the union had
previously promised. Included in the letter were admonitions to the work-
ers urging them to weigh the consequences of their signing. The National
Labor Relations Board found that this activity constituted coercion under
section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and sought enforce-
ment of its order.
The court denied enforcement, holding that the Board had failed to show
substantial evidence of employer coercion. Considering that the union had
raised the secrecy of authorization cards, the court held that the employer
was not precluded from stating its views on the matter. Further, there was
no showing of a threat or reprisal, and the Board's construction of the letter
to the contrary was found to be erroneous. The dissenting opinion stated
that the Board is best able to interpret letters of this type and that the ma-
jority's opinion amounts to a review de novo of the Board's construction of
written communications.
LICENSES
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE D NECESSITY - TRANSFER OF
PART OF LICENSE FOR CONSIDERATION - Harold D. Miller, Inc. v. PUC,
10 Ohio St. 2d 53 (1967). - Plaintiff sought reversal of an order of the
Public Utilities Commission granting transfer of part of a license of public
convenience and necessity from one transport company to another pursuant
to a contract between the parties. The agreement was expressly conditioned
upon the granting of the transfer by defendant commission. Defendant ar-
gued that its "drop and pick up" procedure was a valid exercise of adminis-
trative authority.
The Ohio State Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the "drop and
pick up" procedure was violative of the Commission's power. A license was
held not to be an asset which can be thus negotiated, defendant's ac-
quiescence in a procedure whereby the certificate acquires such an attribute
being unlawful. According to the strict language of section 4121 of the
Ohio Revised Code, the Commission is only authorized to transfer part of a
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certificate upon the death of a holder, upon dissolution of a partnership op-
erating under such a license, or by the request of a receiver or trustee of a
transport company.
LIMITATIONs OF ACTIoNs
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD - AccRUAL OF RIGHT OF ACTION OR DE-
FENSE - Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 224 A.2d 684 (Super. Ct.
N.J. 1966). - Defendant manufacturer sold a water meter to defendant
city in 1942. It was installed by the city in plaintiff's home in 1950. In
1964, the meter burst and caused property damage for which plaintiff sued
both the city and defendant manufacturer. The superior court held that
under the New Jersey six-year statute of limitations, the cause of action for
breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose and
the cause of action based on strict liability in tort both accrued when the
meter was delivered, and plaintiff's action resting on those grounds was
barred. However, plaintiffs claim based on negligence was held not to ac-
crue until damage occured and thus was not barred.
A fundamental principle of the law governing limitation of actions is
that the period of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues.
It is upon this latter phrase that courts have differed. The case at bar ap-
plies the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-725 (2) which states that, in
regard to sales contracts, a cause of action accrues when the breach occurs
and that breach of a present warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made.
NEGLIGENCE
FLIGHT INSURER'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS - DuTY To SCREEN AP-
PLICANTS - Galanis v. Mercury Int'l Ins. Underwriters, 55 Cal. Rptr. 890
(Ct. App. 1967). - Plaintiffs brought an action against several insurance
companies who, by means of automatic vending machines, had sold flight
insurance to a suicide-murderer who caused the crash of the plane upon
which plaintiffs' decedents were passengers. The complaint alleged that de-
fendants were negligent in failing to screen, interview, or investigate the
financial condition of Gonzales the suicide-murderer and that this negligence
was the proximate cause of the airplane crash and the deaths of plaintiffs'
decedents. The trial court sustained defendants' demurred to the complaint
and entered a judgment of dismissal.
In affirming this judgment, the court of appeals found that defendants
were under no duty to protect the insured's fellow airplane passengers by
following an investigatory procedure in selling flight insurance. After de-
termining that there is but a minimal risk that a purchaser of insurance will
cause a plane crash, the court reasoned that the great social utility of flight
insurance would be defeated by a rule requiring that all applicants be
screened and interviewed prior to the issuance of their policies.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR - MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL - CusZmano '.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ohio App. 2d 105, 223 N.E.2d 477 (1967). -
Plaintiff was seriously injured when, in attempting to remove a case of
Pepsi-Cola from the top of a stack of such cases, the case collapsed. The
defendant's driver-salesman had stacked the cases in plaintiffs stockroom
two days earlier. Evidence at trial demonstrated that no one had disturbed
the cases from the time they were stacked until the time of the accident.
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The court, while reversing a judgment for plaintiff on other grounds, held
that under the facts, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
Ohio, as do many jurisdictions in dealing with res ipsa loquitur, recog-
nizes an exception to the general rule that the defendant's actual control
and management of the injury-producing instrument is required. The ex-
ception states that if the instrument causing the injury has not been out of
the hands of the defendant for more than a reasonable time and if the plain-
tiff can show that there has been no intervening force affecting the instru-
ment, the doctrine is applicable.
SCHooLs AND SCHOOL DIsTRs
Aum STUDENTS - REGULATION OF EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES -
Board of Directors v. Green, 147 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1967). - Pursuant to
defendant board's rule excluding married high school pupils from participa-
tion in extracurricular activities, plaintiff, who knew of the rule before his
marriage, was not allowed to play on the high school basketball team. Fol-
lowing an equity court's ruling enjoining enforcement of the rule, plaintiff
graduated from high school, thereby making the issue moot. However, the
appellate court heard the question because of the great public interest in-
volved in having a determination made as to the enforceability and legality
of the rule.
A reversal of the trial court's decision resulted because plaintiff had not
established that the board abused its broad discretion by adopting the rule.
Since participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege which must be
regulated, the present rule's "mere differentiation" of students was held to
be not so invidiously discriminating as to constitute a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CREDITORS' RIGHTS - PERFECTED SECuRITY INTEREST - National Shaw-
taut Bank v. Vera, 223 NXE.2d 515 (Mass. 1967). - Plaintiff, assignee of
a vendor's conditional contract of sale of an automobile upon which a bal-
ance was due, sued defendant for conversion of the automobile after defen-
dant had purchased it for his personal use at an execution sale resulting from
a judgment which he had obtained as an attaching creditor of the vehicle's
vendee. Plaintiff had not recorded a financing statement covering the con-
tract. The trial court rendered judgment for defendant, finding that he had
no notice of plaintiff's unrecorded security interest.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, reversing the trial court's decision,
stated that under Massachusetts law, which follows the Uniform Commercial
Code, the filing of a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a secur-
ity interest in consumer goods. Although under section 9-307(2) of the
Massachusetts General Laws a good faith purchaser in a voluntary transac-
tion can prevail over one who has failed to file his perfected security in-
terest, the court held that an execution sale is not a "voluntary transaction"
and that defendant, an attaching creditor, was not a good faith "buyer"
within the meaning of the statute and thus could not prevail over plaintiff's
perfected security interest.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES - USE AND DISPOSAL OF COLLAT-
ERAL - Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Ore. 1966). - Ap-
pellant, a secured creditor, brought an action to foreclose a lien on a
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manufacturer's inventory in possession of appellee, a supplier of raw ma-
terials. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that appellants security interest
in the inventory was not defeated when appellee delivered veneer to the
manufacturer and accepted inventory plywood as payment. The transaction
was not a sale in the ordinary course of business despite appellees' novel
contention that they received the plywood in consideration for relinquishing
their "reclamation rights" under section 72.7020(2) of the Oregon Revised
Statutes. Appellees did nothing which could reasonably be construed as ex-
changing the plywood for their right to reclaim, and therefore the lower
court judgment in their favor was reversed. The court's decision repre-
sents the policy of upholding those who have availed themselves of the pro-
tection offered by the Uniform Commercial Code.
TAXATION
COST OF SERVICE - REAL OR HYPOTHEnCAL TAX ALLOWANCES - Fed-
eral Power Comm'n v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1003 (1967). -
This case presented the issue of whether the Federal Power Commission, in
determining United's future rate base, made proper allowance for federal
income taxes. The Commission contended that since United was a member
of an affiliated group which had elected to file consolidated tax returns, the
actual tax paid by United was to be used in calculating its cost of service
rather than the standard fifty-two percent tax allowance. United argued
that, notwithstanding the consolidated returns, its allowance should be at
the full fifty-two percent rate.
The United States Supreme Court, in accepting the Commission's view
and in reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that it was
unacceptable to determine the cost of service on a hypothetical figure. The
Court cited the well-established principle that when Congress has failed to
provide a formula to follow, a court should not reject the one employed un-
less it plainly contravenes the statutory scheme of regulation. Four Justices
dissented, contending that the Commission's formula undermined general
tax law by placing a penalty on the decision to file a consolidated return.
EXEMPTIONS - PUBLIC PURPOSE - Graf V. Warren, 10 Ohio St. 2d 32(1967). - Plaintiff appealed from a decision of the Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals which had allowed an exemption for the State Underground Park-
ing Commission, a legislatively created commission. The Commission is-
sued bonds to pay for parking facilities, and the bonds were repaid out of
the earnings. Appellant claimed that the exemption should not be granted
since the parking facilities were not a "public purpose" within the meaning
used in the Ohio Constitution because of the operation's proprietary nature
and the fact that the revenues were to be used to retire the debt rather than
for general expenditures. Appellant further argued that granting an exemp-
tion to a governmental organization competing with similar private opera-
tions was a violation of the equal protection provisions of both the United
States and Ohio Constitutions.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in affirming the Tax Board's decision, relied
on a series of cases which held that, despite the proprietary nature of an
operation, if it was for the public welfare, the operation was a "public pur-
pose" within the constitutional meaning. In a split decision the majority
stated that because the debt was to be retired first the public interest was
being served by reduction of the ultimate debt. The court also held that
the state did not violate the equal protection provisions by taxing a private
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operation which was similar to a state operation as long as the state opera-
tion was for a "public purpose."
LIABILITY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY - EXEMPIIONS - Maxwell v.
Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 195 So. 2d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967). - Plaintiff hospital is a tax exempt nonprofit hospital. Defendant-
county tax assessor refused to recognize plaintiff's duly filed application for
exemption on the ground that plaintiff had violated the civil rights of indi-
viduals by refusing "admission to Negro patients" and by denying "the use of
its facilities to Negro physicians and dentists solely on the basis of race."
The Florida District Court of Appeals held that denying exemption to
plaintiff was an exercise of power in excess of that granted to defendant
because a tax assessor has no authority to impose additional conditions or
restrictions upon those shown to be entitled to an exemption as established
by statute. The court further held that defendant may not plead as an af-
firmative defense the individual civil rights of others because they are the
only ones who can seek redress of such rights.
SCTION 302(1)(b) - REDEMPTION ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO A DIV-
mEmD - Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1967). -
A closely held corporation's redemption of one hundred shares of non-voting
preferred stock (fourteen percent of the total issue) from a shareholder
who owned eighty percent of the common stock and over seventy percent of
the preferred stock was held by the Tax Court to be nontaxable as a divi-
dend under section 302(1) (b) of the Internal Revenue Code because: (1)
the percentage of ownership of the preferred stock was sufficiently reduced
by the redemption, and (2) the amount received from the redemption was
less than the amount that would have been received had the corporation
distributed such amount as a common stock dividend.
In overruling the Tax Court, the appellate court, after examining all
the surrounding facts and circumstances, held that the distribution was tax-
able as a dividend because: (1) no dividend had been declared since the
corporation's formation in 1948; (2) no substantial change in proportion-
ate control or ownership in the corporation had resulted from the redemp-
tion; (3) the corporation had continued to operate at a profit after the
redemption; and (4) no corporate business purpose was served by the re-
demption.
TORTS
DEFENSES TO STRIcT TORT LIABILITY - ASSUMPTION OF RISK - Ferraro
v. Ford Motor Co., 223 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1966). - Soon after purchasing a
dump truck from a Ford dealer, plaintiff encountered malfunctions in the
vehicle's operation; however, he was assured by the dealer's employees that
these malfunctions were not serious or dangerous. A short time later, the
malfunctions caused the truck to become involved in an accident, seriously
injuring plaintiff. Although Pennsylvania courts recognize the theory of
strict tort liability for the sale of defective products, it had not been decided
whether a buyer who voluntarily and unreasonably uses a defective product
and encounters a known danger is precluded from recovery for his injuries.
The state supreme court held that the defense of assumption of the risk
is available to a defendant in suits based upon strict tort liability and that
upon a showing that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plain-
tiffs use was reasonable or not, the question of the defense's applicability
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is one for the jury. In so holding, the court followed the majority view and
the one enunciated in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A, comment
n (1965).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
-Kitle v. Keller, 9 Ohio St. 2d 177 (1967). - An employee filed a claim
for workmen's compensation and was awarded benefits for an injury re-
ceived while moving a desk, such activity being within the scope of his em-
ployment. More than two years after the original injury, plaintiff filed an
application for modification of the award in order to secure compensation
for a subsequently developing disability directly caused by the original acci-
dent but which was not described in the original application.
The court held that section 4123.84 of the Ohio Revised Code did not
bar the employee from such modification because section 4123.52 gives the
Industrial Commission jurisdiction to modify its former findings up to ten
years from the last payment awarded under the finding. This decision clar-
ifies the court's position and puts to rest previously inconsistent statements
on the question.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT - EMPLOYER'S PREMISES - Marlow v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18 (1967). - After completing
his work day, plaintiff was injured in a collision involving his automobile
and that of a fellow employee in a parking lot owned, maintained, and con-
trolled by defendant employer. Plaintiff applied for workmen's compensa-
tion, claiming that his injuries were sustained in the course of his employ-
ment. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, holding that plaintiff was within
the zone of his employment and that he suffered injuries proximately caused
by a natural hazard of that zone.
This case presents more of a clarification than an extention of Ohio's
workmen's compensation coverage and is in accord with many states which
have heretofore declared that employees travelling to and from the situs of
employment are within the zone of employment and are thus entitled to
workmen's compensation.
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